Ceplin Command Identifier

Identifier / Programs / Windows

cl_loadassembly.ps1

LOLBAS Execute 1 ATT&CK technique 1 documented command

Opens the identifier with your command. It is read in your browser and sent nowhere.

How cl_loadassembly.ps1 is abused

documented by LOLBAS

Execute T1216 System Script Proxy Execution

Run by powershell.exe

-ep
-command
-path

Each abuse is LOLBAS's category and the options and words it uses; the full write-up is on LOLBAS's page for cl_loadassembly.ps1.

1 documented command

from LOLBAS, each read by the identifier

Execute T1216 System Script Proxy Execution User privileges

Proxy execute Managed DLL with PowerShell

powershell.exe -ep bypass -command "set-location -path C:\Windows\diagnostics\system\Audio; import-module .\CL_LoadAssembly.ps1; LoadAssemblyFromPath ..\..\..\..\testing\fun.dll;[Program]::Fun()"
Identify

Trips 4 Sigma rules: highSuspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Daniel Bohannon (idea), Roberto Rodriguez (Fix); mediumAssembly Loading Via CL_LoadAssembly.ps1 by frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems); mediumChange PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level by frack113; lowImport New Module Via PowerShell CommandLine by Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)

The command the identifier reads trips a Sigma process-creation rule. These commands and their descriptions are from LOLBAS’s entry for cl_loadassembly.ps1, by Jimmy (@bohops), at commit 2056cb766250 of 2026-09-26, under the GPL-3.0 and LOLBAS’s notice, with no warranty. Changed: Markdown is shown formatted. The source is in lolbas-gtfobins-commands.json.gz, and the full entry is on LOLBAS’s page for cl_loadassembly.ps1. The identifier reads it with LOLBAS’s placeholders filled in: a URL as https://example.com/file, a share as \\192.0.2.10\share\file, a path as C:\Data\file and a command as calc.exe.

What detects it

Sigma process creation rules
T1216System Script Proxy Execution