Ceplin Command Identifier

Identifier / Programs / Windows

conhost.exe

Console Window Host file version info (xCyclopedia)

LOLBAS Execute 14 Sigma rules name it 7 ATT&CK techniques 2 documented commands 10 known copies with hashes

Opens the identifier with your command. It is read in your browser and sent nowhere.

How conhost.exe is abused

documented by LOLBAS

Execute T1202 Indirect Command Execution

--headless

Each abuse is LOLBAS's category and the options and words it uses; the full write-up is on LOLBAS's page for conhost.exe.

2 documented commands

from LOLBAS, each read by the identifier

Execute T1202 Indirect Command Execution User privileges

Execute a command line with conhost.exe as parent process

conhost.exe {CMD}
Identify

Execute T1202 Indirect Command Execution User privileges

Execute a command line with conhost.exe as parent process

conhost.exe --headless {CMD}
Identify

None of the 2 commands the identifier reads trips a Sigma process-creation rule. These commands and their descriptions are from LOLBAS’s entry for conhost.exe, by Wietze Beukema, at commit 2056cb766250 of 2026-09-26, under the GPL-3.0 and LOLBAS’s notice, with no warranty. Changed: Markdown is shown formatted. The source is in lolbas-gtfobins-commands.json.gz, and the full entry is on LOLBAS’s page for conhost.exe. The identifier reads each with LOLBAS’s placeholders filled in: a URL as https://example.com/file, a share as \\192.0.2.10\share\file, a path as C:\Data\file and a command as calc.exe.

What detects it

Sigma process creation rules
highRedSun - Conhost.exe Spawned by TieringEngineService.exeSwachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), @unresolvedhost
mediumConhost Spawned By Uncommon Parent ProcessTim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
criticalDNS RCE CVE-2020-1350Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
criticalWMI Backdoor Exchange Transport AgentFlorian Roth (Nextron Systems)
highSuspicious Sysmon as Execution ParentFlorian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton (fp werfault)
highUnusual Child Process of dns.exeTim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
highSuspicious Process ParentsFlorian Roth (Nextron Systems)
highSystem File Execution Location AnomalyFlorian Roth (Nextron Systems), Patrick Bareiss, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
highBypass UAC via WSReset.exeE.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Tony Lambert), oscd.community, Florian Roth
mediumUncommon Child Process Of AddinUtil.EXEMichael McKinley (@McKinleyMike), Tony Latteri (@TheLatteri)
mediumPotential Defense Evasion Via Binary RenameMatthew Green @mgreen27, Ecco, James Pemberton @4A616D6573, oscd.community, Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
T1134.002Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token
T1202Indirect Command Execution
T1564.003Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window

Is it the real conhost.exe?

file version info and known copies
Installed inC:\Windows\system32\
Signed byMicrosoft Windows
ProductMicrosoft Windows Operating System, Microsoft Corporation
DescriptionConsole Window Host

10 known copies

10.0.22000.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\WINDOWS\system32\conhost.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows

27df0052dc30abf0c834b61c684ba8e11b4a480b308908267282dd2ed71ea894

10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows

22117361c2c34cb18beee2ca9770b3aa6c8d032a0941991454dd222bec6d9295

10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows

57b0ccd3aebc6c7126e7c19f5dac492df51d904a505c5f5b0cb02270d53f8684

10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows

7a9595b552e23fb058a698ed8201369eeecaee69bd3650ee1e9fe924e64c2be1

10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows

a9b3185119953859889b462faf68d75df365ff569ee1b9a5c5ce1c26cb443cb9

10.0.18362.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\WINDOWS\system32\conhost.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows

baf97b2a629723947539cff84e896cd29565ab4bb68b0cec515eb5c5d6637b69

10.0.17763.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows

697334c236cce7d4c9e223146ee683a1219adced9729d4ae771fd6a1502a6b63

10.0.17763.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows

912d217d9f34121bc6150a2d7f22b49d2c876942653348c671f358ff58af0eba

10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616) · C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows

046f7a1b4de67562547ed9a180a72f481fc41e803de49a96d7d7c731964d53a0

6.3.9600.16384 (winblue_rtm.130821-1623) · C:\windows\system32\conhost.exe · not signed

f30686dd09b81d4080ab58def209173772fa132fa3762688274270afa6407872

From the file’s version info and the copies recorded by xCyclopedia (MIT). A copy in another folder, signed by someone else or with another hash is not necessarily malicious, but it is worth a closer look. In Ceplin, "<sha256>".whatis() says which known copy a hash is.