ieframe.dll

Internet Browser file version info (xCyclopedia)

LOLBAS Execute 1 ATT&CK technique 1 documented command 2 known copies with hashes

How ieframe.dll is abused

documented by LOLBAS

Execute T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

Run by rundll32.exe: ieframe.dll,openurl

Each abuse is LOLBAS's category and the options and words it uses; the full write-up is on LOLBAS's page for ieframe.dll.

1 documented command

from LOLBAS, each read by the identifier

Execute T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 User privileges

Launch an executable payload via proxy through a(n) URL (information) file by calling OpenURL.

rundll32.exe ieframe.dll,OpenURL {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.url}

Identify

Trips 1 Sigma rule: mediumPotentially Suspicious Rundll32 Activity by juju4, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)

The command the identifier reads trips a Sigma process-creation rule. These commands and their descriptions are from LOLBAS’s entry for ieframe.dll, by LOLBAS Team, at commit 2056cb766250 of 2026-09-26, under the GPL-3.0 and LOLBAS’s notice, with no warranty. Changed: Markdown is shown formatted. The source is in lolbas-gtfobins-commands.json.gz, and the full entry is on LOLBAS’s page for ieframe.dll. The identifier reads it with LOLBAS’s placeholders filled in: a URL as https://example.com/file, a share as \\192.0.2.10\share\file, a path as C:\Data\file and a command as calc.exe.

What detects it

Sigma process creation rules

T1218.011System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

Is it the real ieframe.dll?

file version info and known copies

Installed inC:\Windows\system32\
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\

Signed byMicrosoft Windows

ProductInternet Explorer, Microsoft Corporation

DescriptionInternet Browser

2 known copies

11.00.19041.488 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ieframe.dll · signed by Microsoft Windows

78aa17963926353ee79c27d8660daf2698e762f251f9ad095b3e01aa5bc88013

11.00.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\Windows\system32\ieframe.dll · signed by Microsoft Windows

3c95b0507ed729bde94c6887ee473ecac996e67e8028fed0dd81de8ffc283bcd

From the file’s version info and the copies recorded by xCyclopedia (MIT). A copy in another folder, signed by someone else or with another hash is not necessarily malicious, but it is worth a closer look. In Ceplin, "<sha256>".whatis() says which known copy a hash is.