Ceplin Command Identifier

Identifier / Programs / Windows

syssetup.dll

Windows NT System Setup file version info (xCyclopedia)

LOLBAS AWL Bypass, Execute 1 ATT&CK technique 2 documented commands 2 known copies with hashes

Opens the identifier with your command. It is read in your browser and sent nowhere.

How syssetup.dll is abused

documented by LOLBAS

AWL Bypass T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

Run by rundll32.exe: syssetup.dll,setupinfobjectinstallaction defaultinstall

Execute T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

Run by rundll32.exe: syssetup.dll,setupinfobjectinstallaction defaultinstall

Each abuse is LOLBAS's category and the options and words it uses; the full write-up is on LOLBAS's page for syssetup.dll.

2 documented commands

from LOLBAS, each read by the identifier

AWL Bypass T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 User privileges

Execute the specified (local or remote) .wsh/.sct script with scrobj.dll in the .inf file by calling an information file directive (section name specified).

rundll32 syssetup.dll,SetupInfObjectInstallAction DefaultInstall 128 {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.inf}
Identify

Trips 1 Sigma rule: mediumPotentially Suspicious Rundll32 Activity by juju4, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)

Execute T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 User privileges

Launch an executable file via the SetupInfObjectInstallAction function and .inf file section directive.

rundll32 syssetup.dll,SetupInfObjectInstallAction DefaultInstall 128 {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.inf}
Identify

Trips 1 Sigma rule: mediumPotentially Suspicious Rundll32 Activity by juju4, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)

All 2 commands the identifier reads trip a Sigma process-creation rule. These commands and their descriptions are from LOLBAS’s entry for syssetup.dll, by LOLBAS Team, at commit 2056cb766250 of 2026-09-26, under the GPL-3.0 and LOLBAS’s notice, with no warranty. Changed: Markdown is shown formatted. The source is in lolbas-gtfobins-commands.json.gz, and the full entry is on LOLBAS’s page for syssetup.dll. The identifier reads each with LOLBAS’s placeholders filled in: a URL as https://example.com/file, a share as \\192.0.2.10\share\file, a path as C:\Data\file and a command as calc.exe.

What detects it

Sigma process creation rules
T1218.011System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

Is it the real syssetup.dll?

file version info and known copies
Installed inC:\Windows\system32\
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\
Signed byMicrosoft Windows
ProductMicrosoft Windows Operating System, Microsoft Corporation
DescriptionWindows NT System Setup

2 known copies

10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\Windows\SysWOW64\syssetup.dll · signed by Microsoft Windows

33dd3b9c831b95b3904218efae3810fcc1583e7bdb8ba4c4fc8e1b7a8abf1b46

10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\Windows\system32\syssetup.dll · signed by Microsoft Windows

9268f6a26d8f2a82344680a95c241be06ca53f27bc266a4c8d1274d4a7e128fe

From the file’s version info and the copies recorded by xCyclopedia (MIT). A copy in another folder, signed by someone else or with another hash is not necessarily malicious, but it is worth a closer look. In Ceplin, "<sha256>".whatis() says which known copy a hash is.