Identifier / Programs / Windows
unregmp2.exe
Microsoft Windows Media Player Setup Utility file version info (xCyclopedia)
LOLBAS Execute 1 Sigma rule name it 2 ATT&CK techniques 1 documented command 10 known copies with hashes
How unregmp2.exe is abused
Each abuse is LOLBAS's category and the options and words it uses; the full write-up is on LOLBAS's page for unregmp2.exe.
1 documented command
Execute T1202 Indirect Command Execution User privileges
Allows an attacker to copy a target binary to a controlled directory and modify the 'ProgramW6432' environment variable to point to that controlled directory, then execute 'unregmp2.exe' with argument '/HideWMP' which will spawn a process at the hijacked path '%ProgramW6432%\wmpnscfg.exe'.
rmdir %temp%\lolbin /s /q 2>nul & mkdir "%temp%\lolbin\Windows Media Player" & copy C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe "%temp%\lolbin\Windows Media Player\wmpnscfg.exe" >nul && cmd /V /C "set "ProgramW6432=%temp%\lolbin" && unregmp2.exe /HideWMP"IdentifyTrips 6 Sigma rules: highLOL-Binary Copied From System Directory by Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems); highSuspicious Calculator Usage by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems); mediumLolbin Unregmp2.exe Use As Proxy by frack113; mediumSuspicious Copy From or To System Directory by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems); lowCMD Shell Output Redirect by frack113; lowDirectory Removal Via Rmdir by frack113
The command the identifier reads trips a Sigma process-creation rule. These commands and their descriptions are from LOLBAS’s entry for unregmp2.exe, by Wade Hickey, at commit 2056cb766250 of 2026-09-26, under the GPL-3.0 and LOLBAS’s notice, with no warranty. Changed: Markdown is shown formatted. The source is in lolbas-gtfobins-commands.json.gz, and the full entry is on LOLBAS’s page for unregmp2.exe. The identifier reads it with LOLBAS’s placeholders filled in: a URL as https://example.com/file, a share as \\192.0.2.10\share\file, a path as C:\Data\file and a command as calc.exe.
What detects it
Is it the real unregmp2.exe?
C:\Windows\system32\C:\Windows\SysWOW64\10 known copies
12.0.22000.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\WINDOWS\system32\unregmp2.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows
55231ee05bf4b890092c9dede553dd1ce458d829be2b4357204e6deb65b005d312.0.22000.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\WINDOWS\SysWOW64\unregmp2.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows
f9af19cc25b23c572cab738672348c09b6d757b6983e6e2d06c3024cefae835512.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\Windows\system32\unregmp2.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows
21f41fea24dddc8a32f902af7b0387a53a745013429d8fd3f5fa6916eadc839d12.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unregmp2.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows
cc883043adccfa1dd61b3da09d89940f3b97a6e74a09aa32d0d339b0553cd72812.0.18362.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\WINDOWS\system32\unregmp2.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows
8b9ecd5fa290a630f13e016f37a8f45f493b0de67a85cd11c86580c8861bdd2112.0.18362.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\WINDOWS\SysWOW64\unregmp2.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows
a09ea06072956c0f8dd7b46793de05de1eb6a34eb32cfda17b674060fa20019312.0.17763.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unregmp2.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows
1df2f5fc3369f5901068ad9463d7a165fd8e7ee7a12ca6c1a88992bb1484632e12.0.17763.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800) · C:\Windows\system32\unregmp2.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows
df160aced402899269a07872038e7cebe64cbb24dd09d8a4474b12aa6f76065312.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616) · C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unregmp2.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows
c9abd0b301ec1472dc12e6d8333228af97d9831f55d6b2df17e4b3639358000612.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616) · C:\Windows\system32\unregmp2.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows
deba397177c965811e35b502d515956cc419781233334fb47cefda850021f216From the file’s version info and the copies recorded by xCyclopedia (MIT). A copy in another folder, signed by someone else or with another hash is not necessarily malicious, but it is worth a closer look. In Ceplin, "<sha256>".whatis() says which known copy a hash is.