visualuiaverifynative.exe

Visual UIA Verify file version info (xCyclopedia)

LOLBAS AWL Bypass 1 Sigma rule name it 1 ATT&CK technique 1 documented command 4 known copies with hashes

How visualuiaverifynative.exe is abused

documented by LOLBAS

AWL Bypass T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution

Each abuse is LOLBAS's category and the options and words it uses; the full write-up is on LOLBAS's page for visualuiaverifynative.exe.

1 documented command

from LOLBAS, each read by the identifier

AWL Bypass T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution User privileges

Generate Serialized gadget and save to - C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaminguiverify.config before executing.

VisualUiaVerifyNative.exe

Identify

Trips 1 Sigma rule: mediumUse of VisualUiaVerifyNative.exe by Christopher Peacock @SecurePeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io

The command the identifier reads trips a Sigma process-creation rule. These commands and their descriptions are from LOLBAS’s entry for visualuiaverifynative.exe, by Jimmy (@bohops), at commit 2056cb766250 of 2026-09-26, under the GPL-3.0 and LOLBAS’s notice, with no warranty. Changed: Markdown is shown formatted. The source is in lolbas-gtfobins-commands.json.gz, and the full entry is on LOLBAS’s page for visualuiaverifynative.exe. The identifier reads it with LOLBAS’s placeholders filled in: a URL as https://example.com/file, a share as \\192.0.2.10\share\file, a path as C:\Data\file and a command as calc.exe.

What detects it

Sigma process creation rules

mediumUse of VisualUiaVerifyNative.exeChristopher Peacock @SecurePeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io

T1218System Binary Proxy Execution

Is it the real visualuiaverifynative.exe?

file version info and known copies

Installed inC:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\bin\10.0.19041.0\arm64\UIAVerify\
C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\bin\10.0.19041.0\arm\UIAVerify\
C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\bin\10.0.19041.0\x64\UIAVerify\

Signed byMicrosoft Windows Kits Publisher

ProductMicrosoft Windows Operating System, Microsoft Corporation

DescriptionVisual UIA Verify

4 known copies

10.0.19041.1 · C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\bin\10.0.19041.0\arm\UIAVerify\VisualUIAVerifyNative.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows Kits Publisher

795434107117ba9d0d75d6502da003d4765f978460e83746dbb7121bcb622cfb

10.0.19041.1 · C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\bin\10.0.19041.0\arm64\UIAVerify\VisualUIAVerifyNative.exe · signed by Microsoft Windows Kits Publisher

a3f0a0f01d200a855d9e3c1685fed0fd938a1fa43f005b3f33c071a449ead11e

10.0.19041.1 · C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\bin\10.0.19041.0\x64\UIAVerify\VisualUIAVerifyNative.exe · signed by Microsoft Corporation

b2f5b2cb9474dc3c7ad50002a34dfc16f8bd82120c86fa3bdd7db8c73b19441f

10.0.19041.1 · C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\bin\10.0.19041.0\x86\UIAVerify\VisualUIAVerifyNative.exe · signed by Microsoft Corporation

bc5c3ede178ff6cbc7d8474dc4fa330b8a334dc29d7128e919077a40ffad3e75

From the file’s version info and the copies recorded by xCyclopedia (MIT). A copy in another folder, signed by someone else or with another hash is not necessarily malicious, but it is worth a closer look. In Ceplin, "<sha256>".whatis() says which known copy a hash is.